Pist 10 - Recently Updated Pages

PIST 10 Base

geraldanthro — Sat, 22 Mar 2008 18:56:19 CDT

Bloggers, you can put in "Intelligence requests" in Company "C".
Just set up new page, and note on home page.
It would be nice to have some badges, graphic, that says "Backed by Company "C".
To post on blogs, with link to Company C. G

PEOPLE'S INFORMATION SUPPORT TEAM

A People's Information Support Team is a Civilian Irregular Information volunteer auxiliary on-line working group collaborating on electronic media engagement of oppositional, neutral and friendly blogs, forums, discussion groups and websites. Irregulars have no official Table of Organization and Equipment and are under no obligation to follow doctrine, but this particular PIST is a five-person element
composed of a Team Chief, an Assistant Team Chief, two Civilian Irregular Counterpropagandists with photography, videography, journalism or editing skills; and an analyst with linguistic and area studies specialties.

Capabilities to be developed:

Disseminate selected public information to target audiences.

Counter enemy propaganda.

YouTube Smackdown

Counter enemy Morale Operations

Cheerleader

Attack anti-military arguments

Publicize heroes

Resist infantilization, victimization, marginalization and slander of American soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen

Engage Hostile Media

Relentless, destructive critique of MSM persons and publications

Expose media bias

Resurrect buried stories

Force corrections

The ultimate objective of PIST is to convince domestic audiences to take actions contributing to the defeat of Islamofascist terrorists and their supporters. PIST should promote resistance within the domestic civilian populace against hostile ideology or enhance the image and legitimacy of friendly ideologies.

Steven Metz, Rethinking Insurgency

p. 12 The most common evolutionary path for 21st century organizations—be they corporations, political organizations, or something else—is to become less rigidly hierarchical, taking the form of decentralized networks or webs of nodes (which may themselves be hierarchical). Such organizations are most effective in a rapidly changing, information saturated environment.20 Insurgent movements organized as “flat” networks or semi-networks are more flexible and adaptable than rigidly hierarchical ones. Resources, information, and decisionmaking authority are diffused. Such organizations are effective in
environments where rapid adaptation is an advantage. In the contemporary era, polyglot organizations which combine a centralized, hierarchical dimension (which gives them task effectiveness) and a decentralized, networked dimension (which gives them flexibility and adaptability) can maximize mission effectiveness.

p.28-29 One other type of militia merits consideration. Some analysts contend that the Internet has made “virtual” militias (and insurgencies) possible and potentially dangerous.66 That runs counter to the definition of militias used here since “virtual” militias do not control territory or assume state functions. Perhaps, though, virtual militias and insurgents should be considered a separate category. Interestingly, just as the emergence of “real” insurgents sometimes spawn the creation of counterinsurgent militias the emergence of “virtual” insurgents has led to the formation of virtual counterinsurgent vigilantes. One example is the “Internet Haganah, part of a network of private anti-terrorist web monitoring services, which collects information on extremist websites, passes this on to state intelligence services, and attempts to convince Internet service providers not to host radical sites.67 The logic is that it takes a network to counter a network. As insurgents and terrorists become more networked and more “virtual,” states, with their inherently bureaucratic procedures and hierarchical organizations, will be ineffective. Vigilantes, without such constraints, may be.

Distributed IO by PSYOP Auxiliaries and Volunteer Counter Propagandists

Blogospheric Resistance — IO In Denied Battle Spaces

PSYOP Surrogates and Propaganda Proxies

Virtual Cyber Militias Must Run with the Ball OGAs Dropped

The Taliban Turn Too Tough

cannoneerno4 — Wed, 19 Mar 2008 06:34:30 CDT

http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/afghan/articles/20080319.aspx

. . . The increased number of suicide bomber attacks are of dubious value. As in Iraq, most of the victims are civilians, which turns more of the population against the Taliban. Arabs have been more willing to accept the al Qaeda religious belief that Moslem civilians caught by a suicide bomb are "involuntary martyrs", and Moslems who don't agree with al Qaeda are not really Moslems at all, and can be killed. Even in Arab nations, most of the population was appalled at these attitudes, and have turned against al Qaeda in the last five years. Afghans are less tolerant of this kind of terrorist violence. But al Qaeda has shifted personnel and cash from Iraq (where they have been defeated) to Afghanistan, and al Qaeda still believes in suicide bombings. So if the Taliban wants al Qaeda help, it's got to accept the dead civilians. The Taliban believe that the few NATO troops killed in these attacks have a disproportionate impact on politics back in Europe, and the pressure to pull NATO troops out of Afghanistan. The Taliban is also paying more attention to Information War. They quickly claim dead civilians any time foreign troops drop a bomb near a residential area. This press release tactic is automatic, even if there are no dead civilians. Taliban publicists know how the mass media works, and get their version out quickly, and with the most dramatic claims. The Taliban knows that leftists in Europe, and Islamic radicals worldwide, have come to see the war in Afghanistan as a "war against Islam." Leftist and Islamic radical demonstrations in Europe have an impact on public opinion in nations that have troops in Afghanistan. If the Taliban can't defeat these troops, they can get them withdrawn by their governments. The Taliban are also fighting an increasingly desperate war against spies and informers. As more Afghans get terrorized by the Taliban, more of them are willing to provide information to the police and foreign troops. This has proved to be deadly for the Taliban. Up to half the Taliban killed in the past year were the result of Afghans providing information to the government. The Taliban counter-intelligence effort is generally counter-productive, earning more hatred from Afghans. Attacking cell phone towers is an example of counter-productive efforts. Afghans love their cell phones, and don't like having it interrupted. Afghans also don't like bullies. The independent streak in Afghan culture works against the Taliban in this case. The Taliban have internal problems as well. The organization is becoming more radical as many more "moderate" members leave in disgust at the slaughter of civilians and bullying. Many pro-Taliban tribesmen are also upset at the links with the drug gangs. Drug addiction is now a growing problem in southern Afghanistan. This is not good, because everyone knows what this has done in Iran and Pakistan. The Taliban are now less "Islamic conservatives fighting to retain their traditional way-of-life," and more fanatics using terror and drug money to have their way.

I was in Kandahar when the first suicide bombers went off in Afghanistan. Pashtuns do NOT consider "martyrdom operations" heroic. They revere the warrior who faces overwhelming odds with a smile on his face, but the Pashtun hero dies at his enemie's hands, not his own. This difference of opinion over suicide bombers is a fissure to be widened.

Ethics, Cyber-Militias, and terrorism, in an exaflood environment

cannoneerno4 — Tue, 18 Mar 2008 19:46:34 CDT

Posted by Münzenberg at 6:20 AM

Soob brought my attention to Michael Tanji's comments at Dreaming 5GW about the nature of western non-state counter-terrorists like the Jawas and PIST versus the floods of Islamic online extremists. It brought up the ethics of what we were participating in. When I talk of ethics, I mean the ethics of transgressing the rules presented by the western state actors that we live under.

Read the whole thing.

site map

geraldanthro — Sun, 16 Mar 2008 01:22:50 CDT

Site map here.

A Seem to be Exploited

cannoneerno4 — Fri, 14 Mar 2008 06:19:09 CDT

Michael Tanji at Haft of the Spear sends a challenge:

If, say, some CIIDG-types were keen on going that route …
Islamic extremists who regularly post messages to a pro-al-Qaida website in Egypt are accusing Afghanistan's Taliban of straying from the path of global jihad. Prominent Taliban have responded
by lashing back with criticism of their own.

Al-Qaida, Taliban: Battle of the bloggers

An internet-fueled squabble between Taliban leaders and influential al-Qaida sympathizers over tactics in Afghanistan hints at deep disagreements that could alter counterinsurgency efforts in that country, writes RFE/RL.
By Ron Synovitz for RFE/RL (13/03/08)

Islamic extremists who regularly post messages to a pro-al-Qaida website in Egypt are accusing Afghanistan's Taliban of straying from the path of global jihad. Prominent Taliban have responded by lashing back with criticism of their own.

The development suggests a rift is emerging between the Taliban leadership and religious extremists in the Arab world - including the al-Qaida network that the Taliban had hosted in Afghanistan while it planned the 11 September 2001, terrorist attacks in the US.

Such a break could affect Afghan government efforts to convince Taliban fighters to lay down their weapons and peacefully resolve their differences with officials, which could in turn influence whether non-Afghan al-Qaida fighters continue to be welcomed among the Taliban.

Internet criticisms of the Taliban follow a February statement from Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar announcing that his movement wants to maintain positive and "legitimate" relations with countries neighboring Afghanistan.

Mullah Omar, who heads a Taliban leadership council that was purportedly formed in 2003, also has said that the Taliban is exploring the possibility of holding peace negotiations with Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government.

"We want to have legitimate relations with all countries of the world," Mullah Omar's statement said. "We are not a threat to anyone. America believes that the Taliban is a threat to the whole world. And with this propaganda, America wants to use all other countries to advance their own interests."

Pro-al-Qaida bloggers who were angered by Mullah Omar's statement were further outraged in early March when the Taliban expressed solidarity with Iran by condemning the latest round of sanctions imposed on Tehran by the UN Security Council over its nuclear activities.

'Nationalist trend'

Anyone with a password can post messages to the al-Qaida linked website. But some of the harshest remarks about the Taliban leadership have come from writers who are labeled as among the most influential on the website.

One of those bloggers - who calls himself "Miskeen" or "The Wretched" - responded to the Taliban declaration on Iran by writing: "This is the worst statement I have ever read [...]. [T]he disaster of defending the [Iranian] regime is on par with the Crusaders in Afghanistan and Iraq."

"Miskeen" also wrote that a "nationalist trend" appears to be penetrating the Taliban. Other pro al-Qaida bloggers have called for al-Qaida leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri to censure the Taliban over their recent statements.

But the Taliban's former ambassador to Pakistan - Mullah Salam Zaief - tells RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan that the bloggers have no understanding of the topic.

"Somebody who is speaking from Egypt really doesn't have knowledge of the exact situation on the ground in Afghanistan," Zaief says. "He doesn't even convey the policies of the whole organization [of Al-Qaida]."

"The conflict in Afghanistan doesn't mean [the Taliban] has to confront the world," Zaief continues.

"Afghans are very tired of war. They want their homeland. They want peace in their country. They want independence. Whether they are Taliban or other Afghans, I don't think either wants to confront the entire international community. The Taliban doesn't want to rule the world."

A path to talks?

Independent analysts link the Taliban's quest for international legitimacy to the possibility of future negotiations with Karzai's government.

Karzai said in September that he was ready to negotiate with the Taliban, including Mullah Omar himself, in order to put an end to the Afghan insurgency. In December, US Ambassador to Afghanistan William Wood said he would support reconciliation talks - with some conditions.

One of the main sticking points for negotiations between Kabul and the Taliban appears to be the fate of al-Qaida. Formal negotiations could lead to the expulsion of al-Qaida fighters from Afghanistan if they did not commit themselves to supporting Karzai's government.

When asked what the Taliban thinks about Al-Qaida extremists trying to dictate Taliban policies in Afghanistan, Zaief said foreign extremists are more interested in their own benefit than what is good for Afghans.

"I think every Afghan now has the experience that with intolerance toward each other - if people do not live in peace and harmony with each other - the bloodshed and devastation will continue for a long time," Zaief said. "Nobody has the right to ignore the importance of stability in Afghanistan. They should at least not be making such irresponsible comments. [The al-Qaida bloggers] were raising the question of the foreign-troop presence in Afghanistan. But now, I think Afghans have to tolerate the presence of foreign troops in the country because they have no other option."

Although Zaief lives in Kabul and his location is known by Karzai's government, he is still considered a prominent member of the Taliban whose views reflect those of the Taliban leadership. But his remarks about the need for Afghans to tolerate the presence of foreign troops were not supported by a Taliban statement on the issue released on 11 March.

That statement says the Taliban's fight is aimed only at driving US-led coalition forces from Afghanistan. It calls on US allies to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. It also calls on Afghanistan's former mujahedin factions to help the Taliban drive US troops from the country.

Leaders of some of those mujahedin factions helped US forces drive the Taliban regime from Kabul in late 2001 and now hold positions within Karzai's cabinet or are prominent members of the Afghan parliament.

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This is kind of personal for me, people. I spent 15 months in Kandahar. Lost friends to Taliban killers. Payback. Seems to me this is the opportunity I've been thinking of for a long time, to prove the value of pajamahadeen as useful auxiliaries in psychological warfare. I'm going to need your help.

Who's in?